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mainly by 61 microbiology laboratories in the public and private sector, in all regions of Cyprus. 
 
The Sexually Transmitted Diseases Network  
This is a voluntary system for reporting a number of sexually transmitted diseases. Reporting is done mainly by 26 
gynaecologists and 14 dermatologists (from both the public and private sector), in all regions of Cyprus.  
All data are entered into an EPIInfo 2000 database which provides statistical analysis and information on 
geographical distribution. 
The system will provide feedback through a six monthly newsletter and will inform countries in the European Union of 
communicable disease developments in Cyprus. 
Priorities in tackling infectious diseases (based on 2003 reporting) currently include viral meningitis, sexually 
transmitted diseases including HIV, endemic typhus, tuberculosis, hepatitis and various bacterial enteric/foodborne 
infections. All the above infectious diseases occur sporadically. Rarely, foodborne infections such as salmonellosis 
cause limited outbreaks. In addition, problems are also encountered with methicillin resistant Staphylococcus aureus 
and other healthcare-acquired infections.  
The recently introduced Network together with the upgrading of microbiology laboratories, is expected to increase 
the sensitivity as well as the specificity of the surveillance of communicable diseases in Cyprus.
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Three influenza pandemics occurred during the twentieth century: “Spanish flu” in 1918-1920, “Asian flu” in 1957-
1958 and “Hong Kong flu” in 1968-1969. Avian influenza in Hong Kong in 1997, (18 proved human cases, of which 6 
were fatal) and the outbreak in the Netherlands in 2003 (74 confirmed human cases, of which 1 was fatal) have 
shown that the threat of a new influenza epidemic must be taken seriously. A pandemic is expected to affect a 
considerable proportion, possibly more than half of the world population, if it is a new virus that no one has immunity 
to. Within the framework of pandemic planning, estimates of expected hospitalisations and deaths are required. 
Because the outcome of an estimate depends on assumptions concerning the virus, a form of a scenario analysis 
must be constructed, in which the calculation is repeated for a range of several, but plausible combinations of 
assumptions. The most important assumptions concern the contagiousness of the virus and the morbidity and 
mortality due to infection in several parts of the population. 
An earlier scenario analysis calculated the total number of infections, hospital admissions and mortality over the 
course of a pandemic [1]. Antiviral drugs (neuraminidase inhibitors) are an important intervention tool in an 
influenza pandemic, because of the high probability that it will not be possible to produce a vaccine against the new 
virus quickly. To judge the impact of possible interventions during a pandemic more accurately, this earlier scenario 
analysis can be extended with a description of the transmission dynamics of the influenza virus in the population. 
Accounting for transmission is essential, because interventions generally interrupt transmission and derive their 
effectiveness from this interruption. A simple example of this is the impact of vaccination on transmission. Because 
successfully vaccinated individuals do not contribute to the transmission, the force of infection is reduced. Non-
vaccinated individuals also benefit from the intervention by means of a smaller chance of catching the disease
A direct protective effect is when an individual’s chance of getting ill is reduced because that individual himself is 
immunised. An indirect protective effect is when the chance of a non-immunised individual getting ill is reduced 
because the intervention reduces the force of infection. Herd immunity to measles is an example whereby susceptible 
children are protected by the indirect impact of vaccination of classmates. Use of antivirals provides indirect 
protection, both successfully by prophylaxis (by means of the same mechanism as vaccination) and as a therapy 
(shortens the infectious period).
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Expected indirect protective effect depends on contagiousness of the influenza virus. Contagiousness is quantified by 
the basic reproduction number R0, defined as the expected number of secondary cases of infection caused by one 
primary infection in an entirely susceptible population. The bigger the value of R0, the larger the extent of the 
epidemic without intervention, and the greater the effort necessary to curb it. An indirect protective effect is largest if 
the intervention succeeds in arousing group immunity (i.e. the net reproduction number is reduced to below the 
threshold value of 1), whereupon the outbreak finishes and newly introduced infections can no longer cause a large 
outbreak. Because historic data indicate that influenza pandemics in the previous century had a rather low R0 (an 
approximate value of 2), interventions during similar future pandemics are expected to have a relatively large 
indirect protective effect.
Interventions aimed at age groups  
School children can drive the transmission of influenza infections (which are transferred by means of contagious 
droplets) because of their large number of contacts. For this reason, interventions aimed at school children will be 
relatively more efficient in reducing the force of infection and creating an indirect protective effect. This contrasts 
with the elderly who have an increased risk of hospitalisation and death as a result of influenza. Interventions aimed 
at people over 65 would be efficient in obtaining a direct protective effect in terms of the number of hospitalisations 
and death rates. A comparison between interventions aimed at alternative age groups is possible with a transmission 
model which assumes particular contact structures between the different age groups.
Modelling the indirect protection of antivirals can indicate which age group can most beneficially be vaccinated. We 
examined the estimated impact of four possible interventions during pandemic that would affect 50% of the 
population in absence of any intervention. In intervention scenario 1 and 2, a vaccine is available only 150 days after 
the pandemic reaches the Netherlands (Figure). In scenario 3 and 4, antiviral therapy is offered to everyone with 
influenza-like syndrome, from the onset of illness. In scenario 1 and 3, after 150 days, all groups at risk of 
complications and all people over 65 are vaccinated against influenza. In scenario 2 and 4 the same number of 
vaccine doses are used to vaccinate a part (49%) of the 5-20 age group who do not belong to the risk groups. A 
vaccine effectiveness of 80% was adopted in individuals younger than 65 years, and 56% in individuals over 65. 
Hospital admission and mortality probabilities were calculated using data from previous inter-pandemic influenza. 
Figure. Effect of four possible interventions for an influenza pandemic on the total number of hospital admissions  
 
The example shows that use of antivirals will affect the best choice of the target group for influenza vaccination. In 
the presence of the antiviral therapy, it could make sense to aim vaccination mainly at the best transmitters (people 
aged between 5-20) and in this way give indirect protection. Without commitment of antiviral resources it is, on the 
other hand, a good idea to aim vaccination at elderly people and risk groups to provide direct protection.
The effectiveness of possible interventions during an influenza pandemic is determined by both direct and indirect 
protection. The indirect protection impact can be decisive in determining the best intervention strategy. Using a 
pandemic influenza model, the impact of intervention on transmission of influenza can be accounted for. Scenario 
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analyses can be an important tool in estimating the sometimes counterintuitive impact of intervention measures 
against influenza and thus can help in drafting prevention policies for future pandemics.
This article was translated and adapted from reference 2 by Jacco Wallinga and the Eurosurveillance Weekly editorial 
team. 
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Influenza pandemic scenario analysis report: could a pandemic be contained using antiviral agents?
Ben Cooper (ben.cooper@hpa.org.uk), Statistics, Modelling and Economics Department, Health Protection Agency 
Communicable Disease Surveillance Centre, London, England
If a new pandemic strain of influenza emerges in the near future, there will almost certainly be, at best, only a 
limited supply of vaccine [1] and initial control efforts will have to depend on other measures. Using a stochastic (i.e. 
probabilistic) influenza transmission model similar to one developed in the 1970s [2], Longini and co-workers 
investigated whether targeted antiviral prophylaxis could contain an epidemic in a small closed community [3]. This 
work extends previous models of antiviral prophylaxis for influenza by accounting for mixing patterns associated with 
households, schools and pre-schools, and neighbourhoods [4]. The authors concluded that, assuming high antiviral 
coverage of exposed groups and short delays between exposure and treatment, prophylactic antiviral treatment 
could be highly effective at reducing the chance of a major epidemic. 
The authors used estimates of the efficacies of influenza antiviral agents for the prevention of infection and disease, 
and for reducing infectiousness, obtained from studies of both classes of antiviral agent: adamantanes and 
neuraminidase inhibitors. A population structure that the authors claim is typical for an American community was 
adopted, and transmission probabilities were assumed to be highest within households, lower in day-care centres, 
playgroups and schools, and lowest within neighbourhoods and the population at large. Age-specific illness attack 
rates were taken from the 1957-58 influenza pandemic. The authors further assumed that one third of untreated 
cases were asymptomatic, and that these people were 50% as infectious as symptomatic cases. Control policies 
consisted of the treatment (with antivirals) of detected index cases in each mixing group (school, pre-school or 
household), and prophylactic treatment of contacts in the same mixing group one day after symptoms appearing in 
the index case for that group. 
Assuming that 80% of index cases were detected, and that 80% of school, and 100% of pre-school or household 
contacts received prophylaxis, the authors found that one week courses of prophylaxis prevented, on average, just 
over a third of cases compared to the no-intervention scenario. Increasing treatment duration from one to six weeks 
prevented 90% of cases, a policy about as effective as vaccinating 80% of children.
Reduced targeted prophylaxis regimes (targeting just families or schools or pre-schools) were found to have limited 
effectiveness, as were policies targeting much less than 80% of exposed groups. Effectiveness fell considerably if the 
time from index case symptoms to prophylactic treatment was delayed from one to five days (from preventing 93% 
of cases with eight weeks of therapy to preventing only 45%).
These results suggest that an extensive targeted antiviral prophylaxis strategy has, under some circumstances, the 
potential to save many lives. As with all such simulation studies, there are important limitations. First, because the 
virus itself changes and incidence in different age groups varies from year to year, assumptions applicable for one 
pandemic year may not easily generalise to another. Second, in this study, transmissibility was assumed to be 
towards the low end of plausible values (a basic reproduction number, R0, of 1.7 was implicitly assumed). With a 
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